Well, the short to medium term issue with No Deal and supply lines isn't really whether people come to a deal to sell goods, or even the tariffs, it's things like additional import checks and breakdowns in services infrastructure. You basically need to make Dover port twice the size to account for the fact that lorries are taking a lot longer to get through it. If you told me I had to prepare for a No Deal exit in 2016, I would be stalling for as long as possible with the EU whilst throwing all of my actual preparations at increasing the country's economic resilience against shocks like that - I'd have spent the last three years borrowing heavily and investing in power generation, stockpiling of key good, native capacity in energy generation, and shifting the economy hard out of London by taxing the armadillo out of elements of the City that I knew I was going to lose anyway and spending that cash on infrastructure to support manufacturing. As it is, we've done none of that, and I think we're simply not prepared enough to weather it; a government that, as you put it, made people pay 30% more for dinner in the short term would collapse too quickly to be able to see its agenda through anyway, IMO, unless it had an immense parliamentary majority (which will in turn probably never happen while the population is so sharply divided on Brexit).
Norway don't want the UK joining the current EFTA group, because we'd dwarf the other members, but we could easily have just created a separate group with the same functions that solely included the UK. The EU would've been fine with that - their issue is that they won't do any deal that treats the four market freedoms as divisible, so they'll do Norway or closer, and they'll do Hard Brexit or harder, but they won't do any fudges between the two. The real problem with the Norway option is that you don't get to set much of an independent trade policy, and you don't get to vote on what the EU's policy is going to be. It's the only thing that's ever been on the table that I'd actually class as a compromise though, where the result of the referendum is fulfilled but Remainers get enough of what they want that they'd accept it as a new status quo. May's deal, or Corbyn's pseudo-idea-deal, or No Deal, I think will all be sufficiently unacceptable to Remain-leaning people that there'll be a continual pro-EU force in Britain trying to pull us back in if we actually get round to leaving, and that it'll be as strong or stronger a force as Leave-leaning forces were before 2016.
Regarding trade, I think you're thinking about it too much in terms of physical imports/exports, which haven't been the mainstay of Britain's trade strategy for a good century or more now. If you're a country that manufactures a bunch of stuff that other folk want to buy, and it's good enough that they still want to buy it, sure, you get some leverage that way. But we're mainly a country that sells people services, and then buys their stuff with the money they pay us to, among other things, look after their money. Plus we're a knowledge and culture hub as a country; strong universities that export information, decent sized film and tech industries, etc. All those things are really quite mobile, and they're heavily reliant on access to international agreements that go beyond the very limited scope of WTO rules. As long as Britain doesn't politically collapse (which I don't think is an impossible outcome) in the wake of a May style or No Deal Brexit, it would eventually recover of course, but I think it would have to turn into a very different economy in order to do so, and would lose its world-leading status in the areas I just mentioned. I hope I don't have to see that develop but the historian in me would find it quite interesting - I suspect Dublin could become a very major boom-town in the coming years if it allows easy access into European digital (and physical) markets for English speakers and London doesn't any more.